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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF SIM-
IAR PRIOR ACTS-PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-DEGRADATION AND SELF-IN-
cRnMNATIo.-[Utah] During a
trial for statutory rape, the girl
subjected to the assault was called
as witness. The indictment charged
the act was committed July 27th.
The witness was asked by the pros-
ecution, 'Did the defendant have
sexual intercourse with you at any
time between July 4th and July
27th?" Defense counrel objected
on grounds the evidence was im-
material, incompetent, and irrele-
vant, but was overruled. The wit-
ness claimed privilege against self-
incrimination and self-degradation
under the Utah constitution and
statute. Upon denial of privilege
the witness refused to answer and
was imprisoned. On habeas corpus,
the majority of the court held: (1)
evidence of similar acts committed
prior to the one charged are not
here admissible; (2) the claim of
privilege against testifying should
have been allowed for such testi-
mony is, (a) self-degrading and,
(b) self-incriminating. Sadleir v.
Young, 85 P. (2d) 810, (Utah,
1938).
Two judges concurred in part
and dissented in part. On the first
issue of 'admissibility,' the majority
theory was the jury would be prej-
udiced against the defendant by the
testimony if allowed to stand alone
and that the jury would be led to
convict the defendant of an offense
similar in character upon a differ-
ent date, but not charged. This is
in contrast to the minority judges
who confirmed the holding but on
the theory that the testimony was
not pertinent to any material issue.
The general rule admits evidence
of prior similar acts to show intent,
knowledge, or identity. Stone, Ex-
clusion of Similar Fact Evidence
(1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988; State
v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 P. 215
(1900). If the majority theory is
-that the evidence is inadmissible
exclusively because of the result-
ing prejudice, it is untenable. For
where the evidence of a prior sim-
ilar act is pertinent and relevant
to a material issue it is admissible.
State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 Pac.
270 (1913); People v. Patterson, 102,
Cal. 239, 36 Pac. 436 (1916); Com-
monwealth v. Bell, 166 Pa. 405, 31
Atl. 123 (1895). For a discussion
of "admissibility" see note, (1938)
28 J. C. L. 917.
On the issue of self-degradation
all judges concurred in the opin-
[259]
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ion that the testimony requested
would not be to a fact in issue or
to a fact from which the fact in
issue might be presumed and could
be excluded as self-defamatory.
The court's interpretation of the
statute does not conflict with the
general rule: a witness may be
bound to answer if the evidence is
relevant to a material issue being
tried though it tends to defame his
character. Wigmore, Evidence (2d
ed. 1923) §2255; Conway v. Clin-
ton, 1 Utah 215, 220 (1875); Loh-
man v. People, 1 Comstock 379 (N.
Y. (1848); Polk v. State, 40 Ark.
482 (1883); Moor v. Dozier, 128 Ga.
90, 57 S. E. 110 (1907).
The minority's principal point of
divergence from the majority is on
the issue of privilege against self-
incrimination. Involved in the
problem is the jurisdictional and
procedural character of a juvenile
court. The court's attention is fo-
cused on the issue of whether the
constitutional privilege may be ex-
tended to minor witnesses when
their information would subject
them to juvenile court jurisdiction
exclusively.
Adhering to the negative of the
proposition, the minority would
deny minor misdemeanants a claim
of privilege. Their theory is
grounded on the premise that con-
stitutional immunity is a protection
from criminal proceedings only.
In Utah all minor misdemeanants
are subject exclusively to a juven-
ile court exercising equity juris-
diction solely. Since the crime of
which the ravished witness in the
instant case may be guilty, forni-
cation, is merely a misdemeanor,
her severest fate would be a juven-
ile court proceedings. Rev. Stat.
Utah (1933) §§14-7-4, 103-51-5,
103-1-13, 14-7-25. The minority
theory is substantiated by the gen-
eral rule in juvenile court pro-
ceedings. Where the record is fiot
transferrable to a criminal court
the party before the court may not
claim privilege. People v. Lewis,
260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353 (1932).
The proceedings being civil rather
than criminal the constitutional
safeguards in procedural matters
prescribed for criminal cases are
unnecessary. Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198
(1905); Cinque v. Boyed, 99 Conn.
70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923); Wisenberg
v. Bradley, 209 Ia.. 813, 229 N. W.
205 (1930).
Holding to a more literal inter-
pretation of the constitution, the
majority would grant privilege to
minor witnesses. The majority
viewpoint, in contrast to the mi-
nority, pictures procedures and
punishments in juvenile court
equally as prejudicial to the inter-
est of a witness as those of a crim-
inal court. Sentence to a public
institution is as injurious to the
interest of a witness under eigh-
teen as it is to an informant over
eighteen. Not only does this view-
point find support in the constitu-
tion which recognizes no exception
based on age but as a practical
matter any such distinction is
purely arbitrary. Especially is this
true where the age factor simply
changes the label, of the actor by
naming him a juvenile delinquent
instead of a criminal misdemean-
ant. A youth seventeen should not
be denied privilege when it is
granted a hardened criminal testi-
fying in regard to the same act.
People v. Lewis (dissent), supra.
-While the majority's view seems
to ignore the theory of juvenile
court equity proceedings, the mi-
nority doctrine, in its denial of
privilege on an age basis, is also
objectionable because of its arbi-
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trary character. It is suggested
that the two be resolved by using
as a criterion the qualitative char-
acter of the offense with which the
witness might be charged.
Most juvenile court legislation,
as well as bringing recognized
crimes within juvenile court jur-
isdiction, defines new offenses. For
example, jurisdiction is given over
children who are incorrigible, un-
governable, habitually disobedient,
or beyond control of their parents.
Under the qualitative theory priv-
ilege against testifying to crimes
only is granted, while as to these
new offenses it would be denied.
Some legislation confusedly bases
the new offenses on ordinary mat-
u-n in se acts. Under the sug-
gested theory privilege should be
granted in such circumstances also,
for a party accused of a malum in
se act is entitled to constitutional
rights regardless of age. Ex Parte
Mei, 122 N. J. Eq. 125, 198 Atl. 8
(1937).
The historical purpose of the
privilege was protection against (1)
inquisitorial methods, and (2)
crimination as to malum in se
crimes. Wigmore, Evidence, §§2252,
2263; note (1937) 27 J. Crim. L.
746; City of Mobile v. McCowan
Oil Co., 226 Ala. 228, 148 So. 402
(1933). By limiting inquisitorial
methods to new offenses based on
acts expressly not malum in se the
historical purpose of the constitu-
tional privilege is preserved. Thus
the qualitative theory, though it
limits the juvenile court proced-
ures, is desirable for it fulfills the
constitutional intent. At the same
time the new juvenile court pro-
cedures remain intact as regards
those new offenses which are its
principal objective. The new cri-
terion is necessary for the spirit of
constitutional privilege should be
reconciled with the juvenile court
procedure on a more logical basis





An abundance of legal learning has
been devoted to tvo aspects of an
extra-judicial confession, that is,
one not made before a magistrate
or in open court: (1) the question
of whether such a confession in-
dependently establishes corpus de-
licti, and (2) if not, need the evi-
dence introduced to establish it be
consistent with the confession, or
can the latter be corroborated by
evidence distinct from that which
established corpus delicti. These
problems arose recently in a Utah
infanticide case. State v. Johnson,
95 Utah 572, 83 P. (2d) 1010 (1938).
Declaring a mere extra-judicial
confession insufficient to establish.
corpus delicti the majority of the
court stated: "There must be evi-
dence, independent of the confes-
sion, corroborative thereof, con-
sistent therewith, forming a basis
or foundation for the confession,
. . . before the confession may be
considered by the jury as evidence
of guilt." Elaborating the rule, the
court observed that there must be
proof aliunde the confession that
the crime has been committed, or
proof of some fact or circumstance
otherwise confiriatory of the con-
fession. These requisites being
present it would be proper that the
jury "may consider the confession
in evidence, not only in determin-
ing the question of defendant's
guilty participation in the crime,
but also in determining whether
the crime was actually committed."
This proposition permits the estab-
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lishment of corpus delicti by the
confession along with collateral
evidence, each supplementing any
deficiency in the other. It is the
position of the dissent, however,
that a confession has no place in
the determination of a death by
criminal agency, which must be
established by evidence complete
and independent thereof. As a
corollary, the minority believe that,
though the evidence which estab-
lishes the corpus delicti be incon-
sistent with the 'confession, the
latter may still be accorded the
jury's consideration if there is other
evidence corroborative of the con-
fession. This last observation
seemingly conflicts with the ra-
tionale of the rule requiring inde-
pendent proof of corpus delicti.
The purpose of this rule is to
protect persons who, for divers
reasons, confess to crimes which
they did not commit. It would ap-
pear that this purpose becomes
frustrated if a confession, the tenor
of which is inconsistent with the
evidence establishing corpus delic-
ti, is still accorded judicial recog-
nition by attempting to prove it
with collateral evidence.
From early common law to the
present this problem has been
fraught with complexity. In 1784
it was held that a conviction could
be sustained on the uncorroborated
confession alone. R. v. Wheeling,
1 Leach Cr. L., 4 ed., 311. During
the nineteenth century the question
arose frequently, and two rules
were proposed: (1) the corrobor-
ative evidence might be of any sort
whatever; (2) it must relate speci-
fically to the corpus delicti. Of
these two rules, the latter is per-
haps the more general, although in
England and Ireland it seems to
be restricted to homicide cases. 3
'Wigmore, Evidence (lst, ed., 1904)
§2070.
Most jurisdictions in this country
have adopted the rule requiring
corroboration, and the majority of
these have declared that the evi-
dence must concern the corpus de-
licti, though in a few states any
evidence which tends to produce
confidence in the truth of the con-
fession is considered sufficient. 3
Wigmore, Evidence (1st Ed., 1904)
§2071; Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426
(1856).
The independent evidence of
corpus delicti may be either direct
or circumstantial. Most states do
not require that the corpus delicti
be proved by evidence which en-
tirely excludes a consideration of
the confession, but hold that the
confession may be used to strength-
en such evidence. There is con-
siderable disagreement among the
courts on this point, but it is gen-
erally recognized that it is suffi-
cient if, taken together with the
confession, it satisfies the jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the
offense was committed, and that
defendant committed it. 2 Whar-
ton, Crim. Evidence (11 ed., 1935)
1072, §641. See contra: Burrows
v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029
(1931) (murder; clear and con-
vincing proof aliunde, of corpus
delicti required).
Some states have adopted the
rule in statutory form. For ex-
ample, Arkansas: "A confession
of a defendant, unless made in
open court, will not warrant a con-
viction, unless accompanied with
other proof that such offense was
committed." Pope's Stat. Ark.
§4081, Crim. Code §239; and New
York goes even farther and ex-
tends the rule to judicial, as well
as extra-judicial confessions: "A
confession of a defendant, whether
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in the course of judicial proceed-
ings or to a private person, can be
given in evidence against him,
. . .but is not sufficient to war-
rant his conviction, without addi-
tional proof that the crime charged
has been committed." N. Y. Crim.
Code §395.
The reasons given for requir-
ing corroboration of extra-judicial
confessions are that people some-
times confess to crimes that have
never been committed at all, in
order to protect others, or to pre-
vent investigation into another
crime, or merely for publicity, or
because of mental derangement.
Blackstone, in speaking of confes-
sions made without due caution,
said: "They are the weakest and
most suspicious of all testimony;
ever liable to be obtained by ar-
tifice, false hopes, promise of favor
or menaces; seldom rendered ac-
curately or repeated with due pre-
cision, and incapable in their na-
ture of being disproved by negative
evidence." 4 Blackstone,. Com-
mentaries (Cooley's 3rd Ed., 1884),
§355. The rule is in accord with
the so-called humaneness of the
criminal law.
It is hardly to be doubted that
extra-judicial confessions are to be
regarded most suspiciously, but
there is some disagreement among
the authorities as to whether cor-
roboration should be required as a
part of the law of evidence. In
R. v. Unkles, Ir.,R. .8 C. L. 50, 58,
the rule was described as more a
judicial practice than a part of the*
law of evidence. "A party accused
of homicide ought not to be con-
victed on his own confession mere-
ly, without proof of the "finding of
the dead body or evidence aliunde
that the party alleged to have been
murdered is in fact dead."
The suggested distinction be-
tween a "judicial practice" and a
rule of the law of evidence is ap-
parently that one convicted merely
on the basis of an uncorroborated
confession in a jurisdiction where
corroboration is required as a part
of the law of evidence could se-
cure a reversal in an appellate
court by indicating the absence of
corroboration, whereas in a juris-
diction where the "rule" was re-
garded merely as a "judicial prac-
tice" the defendant would have to
show bias or lack of judicial atti-
tude on the part of the judge. In
other words, the "judicial practice"
formula would leave much more
discretion in the hands of the in-
dividual judge than the "evidence"
formula.
Wigmore suggests that the sup-
posed danger the evidence rule is
intended to guard against is great-
ly exaggerated, and emphasizes
that warning can be given the jury
by counsel or by the judge, of the
caution to be exercised in consid-
ering an extra-judicial confession.
He condemns the rule as providing
a means whereby unscrupulous
counsel may trip the judge by some
refinement of verbiage and there-
by obtain reversals. 3 Wigmore,
Evidence (1st Ed., 1904) §2073.
Why this particular rule should
be singled out for condemnation as
an obstruction to justice is difficult
to see. There are countless other
pitfalls for the unwary judge; the
criminal law is full of technicali-
ties. But the technicalities are de-
signed to save the innocent from
unjust or misguided conviction. To
trust to the mercy and beneficence
of a judge in a matter so vital as
the requirement of corroboration
seems to be exposing the defend-
ant to an unnecessary and unjus-
tifiable risk. Surely we may pre-
sume that our judges will know
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the law and will not be caught off
guard any more in the application
of this rule than in the application
of any of the other rules of law.
An interesting modification of
the rule is that which varies the
amount of corroboration required
according to the severity of the
crime charged. In England now,
apparently one may be convicted
of any crime other than a capital
offense upon his own uncorrobo-
rated extra-jud-.cial confession, 1
R. C. L. 586, n. 5, while some other
jurisdictions require corroboration
for all felonies and serious crimes,
but not for the lesser ones. 1 R. C.
L. 586, n. 4. While such procedure
may expedite the business before
the courts, it cannot be too strong-
ly emphasized that extreme cau-
tion should be used in convicting,
even for the lesser crimes, on the
mere uncorroborated extra-judicial
confession of a defendant. Theo-
retically, at least, a man is entitled
to as careful trial where the penal-
ty is light as where it is heavy.
W. R. BERNAYS.
EXCLUSION OF NEGROES FROM
JURY-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH DIsCRnVINATION.-[Fed-
eral] In 1875 Congress enacted a
statute in compliance with the 14th
Amendment, providing that "no
citizen . . . shall be disqualified
for service as grand or petit juror
in any court of the United States,
or of any State, on account of race,
color, or previous condition of ser-
vitude. 8 U. S. C. A. 43 (1875).
Since this enactment it has become
well settled that discrimination
against negroes in the selection of
jurors is ground for reversal of the
conviction of a negro. What con-
stitutes discrimination within the
meaning of this statute depends, of
,course, upon the interpretation
placed thereon by the United
States Supreme Court. Moreoveri,
since the decisions of that tribunal
are binding upon the state courts
(McIntosh v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 469,
128 P. 735 (1912)) and the accused
can always obtain relief in the fed-
eral court (he may petition the
Supreme Court for certiorari, and
even if refused could probably ob-
tain relief in the lower federal
court by habeas corpus-28 U. S.
C. A. 344 (1925); Hale v. Craw-
ford, 65 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 1st,
1933), it would seem that the de-
gree of impartiality required by
the Supreme Court would consti-
tute the minimum to which the
states must accede.
The Supreme Court has enun-
ciated the general principle that
when systematic exclusion of ne-
groes from jury service is estab-
lished, unconstitutional discrimina-
tion is shown. For a review of
the decisions see Carter v. Texas,
177 U. S. 442 (1900); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); and
comment (1934) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 498.
Of course, intentional discrimina-
tion against negroes, if admitted by
the jury commissioner is clearly
sufficient. In Carrick v. State, 41
Okla. Cr. 336, 274 Pac. 896 (1929),
the determining factor in establish-
ing discrimination was the admis-
sion by the jury commissioner that
he would never put a negro on the
jury list because he had never seen
a qualified negro.
But intentional discrimination, if
denied, can be shown by circum-
stantial evidence. It is in this
sphere that the d.fficult factual is-
sue arises. Two main elements
must be shown to establish dis-
crimination. As a prime requisite
the absence of negroes from the
jury over a long period of time
must be established. This element,
while comparatively easy of proof,
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is not sufficient of itself. Pollard
v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. 299, 125 S. W.
390 (1910); Mitchell v. State, 105
Tex. Cr. 297, 288 S. W. 224 ((1926);
Ryan v. State, 123 S. W. (2d) 659
(1939). Secondly, it must be
proved that there were negroes
qualified to serve on the jury in the
particular locality. This factor
alone is also insufficient, but
coupled with the time element has
proved sufficient. In Lee v. State,
163 Md. 56, 161 Atl. 284, the evi-
dence that the negro population of
Baltimore county, a large propor-
tion of which were fully qualified,
was about one-tenth of the total
population, together with the long,
unbroken absence of negroes as
jurors was held to show uncon-
stitutional exclusion of negroes
from jury service. Of course, as
the proportion of qualified negroes
increases, the time element diminr
ishes in importance, and vice
versa. Thus, the tests are mutually
supplementary. Just what per-
centage of qualified negroes in a
locality must be shown has never
been decided by the Supreme
Court, but several states have ex-
pressed their opinion People v.
Hines, 81 P. (2d) 1048 (Cal. 1938)
(conviction reversed, the evidence
showing seven per cent qualified
negroes); Bruster v. State, 40
Okla. Cr. 25, 266 Pac. 486 (1928)
(conviction affirmed, the evidence
failing to show the percentage of
qualified negroes);. Bonaparte v.
State, 65 Fla. 287, 61 So. 633 (1913)
(conviction reversed, the evidence
showing at least one thousand ne-
groes qualified).
The greatest obstacle for the de-
fendant to surmount in -establish-
ing discrimination is to prove that
there are negroes properly quali-
fied to serve as jurors in the par-
ticular locality. This task inheres
with more difficulty than a mere
showing of a large negro popula-
tion. The qualifications necessary
for a juror vary slightly in the dif-
ferent states, but the requirements
generally found among the south-
ern states include residence, liter-
acy, voting, lack of a criminal rec-
ord, intelligence, and good moral
character. Arbitrary determina-
tions by jury commissioners that
no negroes meet the intelligence or
good moral charactef requirements,
have not been tolerated by the Su-
preme Court. Neal v. Delaware,
103 U. S. 370 (1880)..
In addition to the difficulties
arising from the discretionary
powers vested in the jury commis-
sioners, the burden of proof is on
the defendant to show discrimina-
tion. Briscoe v. State, 106 Tex. Cr.
478, 293 S. W. 573 (1927); Mitchell
v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. 478, 288 S. W.
224 (1926); Wilborn v. State, 11
Tex. Cr. 299, 12 S. W. (2d) 578
(929). However, this obstacle is
not as serious as might seem, be-
cause the issue of discrimination
against negroes in jury service
turns on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. Being a question of fact
involving the burden of proof, the
Supreme Court sees fit, in this class
of cases, to review the facts and
draw reasonable inferences and
presumptions. So if the defendant
can show sufficient evidence to
make out a prima facie case, the
burden of proof may shift to the
state, thus relieving the defendant
of the heavy -burden which the
states impose upon him. In Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880),
the Supreme Court had before it
a case involving the conviction of
a negro on grounds of discrim-
ination. The Supreme Court held
that the allegations presented a
prima facie case of discrimination
which shifted the burden of proof
to the state, and failure of the state
to rebut the presumption war-
ranted reversal. See Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935), to
the same effect. The difference
between the interpretation of such
a case by a state court and the
Supreme Court is frequently one
of burden of proof, the state court
holding that the defendant hag not
met the burden of proof, and the
Supreme Court* holding that it has,
and that the failure of a state to
rebut warrants a reversal.
In view of the fact that the Su-
preme Court sets the minimum re-
quirements, it is interesting to ana-
lyze a recent case of discrimina-
tion. In Pierce v. State of Louisi-
ana, 9 S. Ct. 537 (1939), handed
down by Justice Black, the distinc-
tion between the holding of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, and the
United States Supreme Court, is
a difference of burden of proof.
The evidence of twelve witnesses
showed that for twenty years, only
one negro had been called for jury
service, and that the population of
the Parish was composed of from
one-quarter to one-half negroes,
and of these negroes, only twenty-
nine per cent were illiterate. The
Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant had sufficiently met the
burden of proof by this evidence
to shift it to the state, and the fail-
ure of the state to rebut warranted
reversal. The Louisiana Supreme
Court had affirmed the conviction,
emphasizing the fact that there
were four negroes included in the
list of 300. In view of the fact that
a large proportion of the negroes
were disqualified because they
were illiterate, the court was of
the opinion that the number of
negroes on the list was not dispro-
portionate to the number of whites
on the list and that the defendant
had not established discrimination.
Both courts seem to have deter-
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mined the issue on the basis of.
how many negroes were on the
list. Justice Black went to great
pains to show that of the three ne-
groes on the list, one was dead,
and the name of another was listed
incorrectly, leaving only one negro
who had been called, for many
years. The difference in the inter-
pretation of these facts, was the
determining factor, resulting in op-
posite decisions by the two courts.
The interpretation which Justice
Black puts on the evidence, is sup-
ported by the trial judge's finding
of discrimination in the original
petit jury. The trial judge dis-
missed the jury, and ordered that a
new impartial jury be drawn. This
impartial jury convicted the de-
fendant. But the trial judge over-
ruled the motion to quash the in-
dictment because of discrimination,
although the indictment was re-
turned by a grand jury drawn
from the same panel as the original
petit jury. The theory of the trial
judge, in so doing, was that the
constitutional rights of the accused
were not affected by a discrimina-
tory grand jury because the mere
presentment of the indictment is
not evidence of guilt, but merely
brings the accused before the
court. The trial judge was clearly
wrong in his contention as Justice
Black points out, because under
the Louisiana constitution there
must be an indictment to hold a
man for a crime. Under the 14th
Amendment and the Congression-
al statute of 1875, and a Louisiana
statute, the indictment should have
been quashed if qualified negroes
were systematically excluded be-
cause of their color. The evidence,
being sufficient to quash the petit
jury, was sufficient to quash the
indictment. Farrow v. State, 91
Miss. 509, 45 So. 619 (1908).
BETTY BOOTH.
